Crisis and the Commons Today by De Angelis, M. & De Angelis, M.
 
 
 
 Communism in the 21st Century by Shannon Brincat, ed.  
 
Copyright © 2013 by Shannon Brincat.  
 
All rights reserved.  
Reproduced with permission of ABC-CLIO, LLC, Santa Barbara, 
CA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Crisis and commons today. In Shannon Brincat (ed.), 
Communism in the 21st Century, 3 Volumes, Santa 
Barbara: Praeger, Vol. 3. 2014 
 
Crisis and the Commons today 
 
Massimo De Angelis 
 
 
One word, many meanings  
 
While I was growing up in 1970s Italy, the word “communism” echoed many realities 
and horizons. There was obviously the Communist Party, the largest in Western 
Europe, with its bureaucratic structure, its parliamentary opposition to the Christian 
Democrats until the governments of National Solidarity in 1979 in occasion of the 
introduction of austerity policies and draconian anti-terrorist laws.  There were the 
Red Brigates, with their secret cells, their shooting the legs of foremen, trade union 
members  and magistrates, and their first homicides up to the kidnapping and killing 
of the leading figure of the Christian Democrat, Aldo Moro in 1978. There were the 
myriad of little parties and organizations of the extraparliamentary Left, each with 
their distinctive politics and often sectarian attitudes. There were the archipelago of 
collectives and informal groupings in schools, factories, universities, and 
neighbourhoods. There were also those who had found a way to mix their catholic 
roots with communist ideas, the so-called catto-comunist. Finally, there were the 
plethora of “unleashed dogs”, individuals who while not belonging to any particular 
organization, were surfing the movement to find in it the source of some conviviality 
and sociality. There was one word, communism, and many meanings and many 
organisational forms, often in open conflict with one another.  
 
In all these very different cases, people would have defined themselves first as 
communist, and then as a particular type of communist, belonging to this or that 
organization, this or that strand of communist thought. Different groups held a 
different selection of the founding fathers’ thought to which they inspired: Marx- 
Engels, Marx-Engels-Lenin, Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, Marx-Engels-Lenin- Stalin-
Mao, Marx-Engels-Lenin-Trotsky, Marx-Engels-Lenin-Gramsci and, maybe among 
the Metropolitan Indians with some achievement in urban struggle, the influence of 
the Marx brothers was visible.  
 
This just asserts the obvious: that ideas and organisational practices of communism 
are and have been many, and even more so in international contexts. How do I then 
distil from so many practices and theories a meaning of communism that advances our 
critical knowledge of the present and help us construct an emancipated future? 
Disfavouring communism as type of future society or a particular type of human 
action, that is a utopia, I prefer to stick to two broad classical indications, both coming 
from Marx, and that I use as two coordinates in which we can conceive emancipatory 
praxis at different scales and in particular contexts. The first coordinate is the 
understanding of communism as “the movement that abolishes the present state of 
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affair” (German Ideology)1; the second, as the “community of free individuals” 
(Capital)2. These two coordinates give me a communism that is a combination of 
struggle and negation while at the same time it is creation constitution of new social 
relations, a social doing  based on democracy and emancipation. Once I extend the 
reach of “association” of free producers to also include the realm of unwaged social 
cooperation, in today’s context I translate this communism in terms of what I call Plan 
C&D, or “Commons and Democracy.” This is the name I give to the “sense-horizon” 
of a social force that is distinct from capital. In today’s context, capital seems stuck in 
different versions of plan A (Neoliberalism) and unable to shift to a renewed orthodoxy 
of plan B (Keynesianism) and probably trying to co-opt elements of Plan C&D, but 
most likely combining more strictly with elements of plan E&F (exclusion and 
fascism). But in order to give some depth to these assertions, we need to discuss few 
things. In the first section, I review with large brushes the class meaning of the current 
capitalist crisis and its origin with the establishment of the Neoliberal era in the 1980s 
and the end of the Keynesian class deal of the post-war period. In the second section, 
I discuss how the current crisis corresponds to a situation of impasse for capital, that 
is a moment in which capital must find ways to recover accumulation, through 
readjustment of strategies. This impasse however is also a condition of emancipatory 
movements and struggles, that need to coalesce and  direct social cooperation in new 
ways for the creation of alternatives. In the third section I discuss the meaning I give 
to social forces. Borrowing here from social systems theory, I define social forces as 
social systems that coordinates action and strive to expand their social realm. In this 
sense, capital can be understood as a social force in that its systemic circuits of 
accumulation seek expansion. All the same, commons could be understood as social 
force, to the extent their specific circuits of social cooperation seek expansion. 
Borrowing the terminology from system theorists Niklas Luhmann, in the following 
section I then discuss the notion of “Plan” as the particular “sense horizons” of a 
specific social force in given times. By this term I mean an orienting plane within 
which a particular strategic direction is undertaken by the social force given other 
forces. Thus, Neoliberal and Keynesian orthodoxies are two examples of these 
capitalist plans. I fill then broadly outline the state of current plans which include 
Neoliberalism plus (Plan A), Keynesianism plus (plan B), Commuism plus (Plan C&D) 
and Fashism plus (Plan E&F).   
 
 
2008-?: Capitalist crisis 
 
The 2008 sub-prime crisis was an epochal moment, one of those moments after which 
the world is no longer what it seemed just few months earlier, or at least what the 
world as seen through neoliberal eyes seemed to be. The global crisis that 
followedprima facie indicated the end of the neoliberal era as emerged in the late 
1970s. 
1“Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to 
which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement 
which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result 
from the premises now in existence.” (Marx 1845: part 1). 
2 “A community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of 
production in common, in which the labour power of all the different individuals is 
consciously applied as the combined labour power of the community”. (Marx 1867: 
chapter 1) 
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To contextualise the avenues open to different social forces, we need to write a brief 
historical outline of the dynamics of the last 30 years interpreted in the old framework 
of class struggle. Neoliberalism, in fact, arose as a response first by U.S.-UK capitalists 
and then generalised to the globe, to a threefold profitability problem that had resulted 
from the planetary struggles of the previous two decades: the anti-colonial, women, 
student, black and labour movements that in the 1960s and 1970s occurred around 
the world and in the West shook capitalist planners.  The plurality of struggles left 
little room for capital to enact countertendencies to the falling rate of profit at the 
global level.3 The “Plan” that was devised was the post-war deal, Keynesianism, in 
which capital attempted to institutionalise and co-opt wage struggles into mechanism 
of economic growth, pledging to pursue full employment, growing wages (also in the 
social components such as social spending for housing, health, education and transfer 
to the poor or, in the Global South, food subsidies) and an horizon of betterment under 
capitalist growth. In the 1970s it was soon realisedrealized this was no longer possible, 
as the democracy in the streets posited by many struggles in Western “democratic” 
nations were on the way of the sacrifices that were necessary to re-establish 
profitability and restart growth.4  
 
Thus, for capital the threefold problem was: 
  
1) How to cut the social wage (wages plus social benefits) received by the working 
class, and  at the same time ;  
 
2) Allow in some way the reproduction of the working class and their aspiration of 
“betterment”, whilst; 
 
3) Intensify their working lives to increase extraction of surplus value?   
  
The recent sub-prime experiment was the last of many moments taken by the 
neoliberal strategy to deal with this threefold problem. The first one was in 1979, the 
year in which Paul Volker – then chairman of the Federal Reserve – “officially” 
launched the neoliberal era with a sudden 1 percent increase in the interest rate, 
precipitating a global recession. The latter, in turn, created the conditions for 
neoliberal reforms such as financial market deregulation, union busting, cuts in social 
entitlements, tax cuts for the rich, and intensified free trade. The massive explosion 
in debt and financial markets (of which the sub- prime crisis is the latest expression) 
were a major consequence of this. “Excessive” public spending was identified as the 
major source of inflation and unemployment, together with “excessive” wage 
demands.  
 
With the election of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom in 1979 and Ronald 
Reagan in the U.S. in 1981, a new “consensus” started to consolidate among world 
rulers that the wage, in its totality, had to be reduced. This meant  not only wages 
received directly in exchange for labour power, but also the social component in the 
form of transfers and public spending.   
3 There is generally an agreement among Marxist economists that the rate of profit 
generally fell in the 1970s. Disagreement in on the way to measure it and how this 
impacted as a “cause” of crisis.  
4 See Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (1975). For a discussion of the rise and fall 
of Keynesianism in relation to class struggle see De Angelis (2000).  
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With the opening up of capital’s markets, Western governments decreed the 
abandonment of their commitments to full employment and began dismantling the 
social safety net, the central piece of the post-WWII deal. Economic and social policies 
must  henceforth “please” financial capital markets. If governments granted popular 
concessions that redistributed resources from capital to the working class, financial 
capital would go off shore, thus inducing a fall in exchange rates, an increase in 
interest rates, a downturn in business and a rise in unemployment. In the view of 
neoliberals, a “stable economy” meant accommodation to the desires of international 
financial capital that started to act as a disciplinary device at the service of capital 
accumulation. Capital markets started to exert heavy pressure on conditions of work 
– whether waged work in factories or offices, or unwaged work of raising children and 
reproducing lives in the home – through capital’s increased ability to migrate from 
place to place, pitting conditions of working class reproduction against one another. 
Governments now competed against one another to cut public spending that was part 
of the social wage: education, health, housing, to mention just a few.    
  
In the global South, which did not have “advanced” capital markets through which to 
impose the discipline of global capital, the same effects were obtained through the 
management of what became known as the Third World debt crisis, precipitated by 
Chairman Volker’s interest rate increase. In the event of a liquidity crisis in a debtor 
country, the IMF forced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) on all countries in 
crisis with little variation: devalue the currency, thus making imports more expensive 
and enforcing a cut in real wages; privatize water, education, healthcare and other 
national resources, thus opening them up to restructuring and rising precarious 
employment as well as, in the early phase, unemployment; cut social spending; cut 
subsidies on necessities like food and fuel; open up markets to foreign investors; 
promote competitive exports that will help repay debt. In the case of basic resources 
like water, their privatization resulted in attempts to make poor people pay at prices 
they often cannot afford. This wave of “new enclosures”5 was resisted by millions of 
people across the world,6often slowing the process of privatisation, sometimes even 
stopping them. But, as in the case of financial liberalization in the global North, in the 
South the management of debt crises became an opportunity to enclose common 
resources and make people more dependent on the market. In both the North and the 
South, through financial deregulation and free trade, neoliberal capital aimed to turn 
the “class war” of the 1960s and 1970s – when capital’s power faced challenges in 
communities, factories, offices, streets and fields around the world – into a planetary 
“civil war”. A civil war fought through pervasive competition, a way of life that pits 
each community against every other ↓ which in fact meant shifting costs away from 
capital and onto the environment, communities and human bodies,where they no 
longer count as economic costs. It has done this also by policing the divisions between 
the global wage hierarchies as, for example, through the management of borders with 
detention camps, deportation, and the criminalization of migration in both North 
America and Europe.   
 
5 With reference to this period, the term was coined by Midnight Notes Collective 
(1990).  Subsequently, a series of different analyses has mushroomed to refer to the 
role and concept of primitive accumulation in “advanced” capitalism. See for example, 
Bonefeld (2002); De Angelis (2001; 2004); Harvey (2003).  
6 See for example Walton and Seddon (1994).  
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In this context, the development of information and communication technologies, 
together with the drastic reduction in the monetized (but not the environmental) cost 
of global transport, has offered capital a major opportunity to restructure global 
production and construct a system that facilitate its flows from high cost (high 
struggles) into low cost (low struggles). 
  
This global restructuring developed in the last few decades, along with the 
development of financial speculation and the use of debt, has allowed the reduction in 
the value of labor power of global North workers without a proportional decline in 
living standards. This, simply by lowering the price of commodities that enter in the 
wage basket of these workers. For example, the planetary expansion of sweatshops in 
global commodity chains means that U.S. workers could buy pants or digital radios at 
Wal-Mart at low prices. Because of cheap service labor from the South and East ↓ the 
result of massive poverty caused by Structural Adjustment ↓ households in Europe 
and the US now hire Filipina, Mexican or Eastern European women to take care of 
children and aged grandparents.  
  
In the South, meanwhile, this process has made it possible to discipline new masses of 
workers into factories and assembly lines, fields and offices, thus extending 
enormously capital’s reach in defining the terms — the what, the how, the how much 
— of social production.   
In both North and South, the enclosure of resources means an increased dependence 
of working class communities on markets to reproduce livelihoods, less power to resist 
the violence and arrogance of those whose priority is only to seek profit, less power 
to prevent the market from running their lives and, in general a generalized state of 
precarity, where life is precarious and nothing can be taken for granted.   
 
Indeed, both North and South workers were systemically linked, something that is 
revealed by a pattern in global finance that some describe as Bretton Woods II7 and 
is expressed by the enormous U.S. trade deficit and correspondent surplus in China 
and other exporting countries. This systemic link between surplus and deficit 
countries allows the creation of new debt instruments like the one that resulted in the 
sub-prime crisis. The ongoing recycling of accumulated surplus of countries exporting 
to the USA, such as China and oil producing countries, is what has allowed financiers 
to create new credit instruments in the USA.   
  
This global system saw the integration of a series of “deals” made nationally with their 
working classes.8 For example, the (informal) “deal” offered by the elites in the United 
States to its working people has been to buffer the reduction in money wages with 
access to cheaper consumption goods, access to credit and a renewal of the illusion 
that gains in terms education, health, pensions and social security could be made 
through the speculative means of rising stock markets and housing prices   
 
In turn, to allow the reproduction of labour power of 250 millions of unemployed, 
under-employed and dispossessed Chinese, the “communist” leaders need double 
digits rate of growth, and therefore they need both Western markets and their capital, 
know-how and technologies. It is for this reason that they have been willing to recycle 
7 See for example Dooley, M.P., Folkes-Landau, D. and Garber, P. (2003). 
8 For a conceptualisation of “deals” as a control grid within which class struggle is 
regulated, see Midnight Notes Collective (1985). 
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back to the US their enormous trade surpluses, thus contributing to the liquidity 
necessary for the expansion of the many forms of debt in the US. This is a vicious 
cycle that locks everybody into an endless rat race.  
  
At the same time in China and other zones in the Global South, people are being 
offered a different sort of “deal”: industrial employment at wages that, while very low 
by international standards, are still substantially higher than anything obtainable in 
the impoverished countryside. But attached to this there is the promise that, through 
their link to global markets, their conditions of living will gradually improve. While 
over the last few years wages in many such areas seem to be growing thanks to the 
intensification of popular struggles (particularly in China), such gains are impossible 
to generalize. What is being offered to the South is the promise to expand the existing 
urban middle classes who already model their lifestyle and consumption patterns on 
Northern ones. Although an understandable longing for “betterment” is at the basis 
of what has been sold as the “American dream”, what makes it a dream is precisely the 
fact that, even in the US, it has never meant eliminating wage hierarchies, but 
reshaping them. This is a game in which there must, necessarily, be losers.   
  
At the global level however, this is impossible to generalize for two reasons. First, 
environmentally speaking, no matter how much we recycle or how many energy 
efficient light bulbs we use, it would still require several planets to accommodate an 
“American dream” way of life modelled on high energy and individualized 
consumption patterns for six billion people. Second, precisely because this way of life 
requires the further expansion of competition of all against all, of borders and property 
regimes, of enclosures and dispossession, it must always necessarily be dependent on 
hierarchy and exclusion and must be premised on a massive devaluation of capital and 
labour demanded by the crisis. In other words, middle class “betterment” is an illusion 
constructed inbetween the Scylla of ecological disaster and the Charybdis of poverty. 
The only thing this model of development can create are gated communities of 
whatever is left of middle class families accessing privatized social services within the 
borders of their patrolled walls, surrounded by hordes of poor with little access to 
public services and whose entrance through the gates of those enclaves is managed 
for the purpose of serving those gated middle class communities. But as we will see, 
capital plan A still insists this is the way forwards.   
 
It is in this context that we must read the crisis of 2008. This followed a series of burst 
bubbles and Federal Reserve interventions on interest rates which kept inflating the 
American and global economy with debt used to fund speculation, but also to pay for 
housing, for education, for consumption and, for many, bare essentials. In the late 
1990s the dotcom bubble burst and high tech stocks crashed, opening a recession. 
After the 9/11 attacks there were widespread fears of financial collapse, as 
employment keep dropping through July 2003 (in spite of the recession being 
“officially over” in November 2001). Between January and December 2001, the Fed 
cuts its benchmark interest rate 11 times, dropping the key lending rate from 6.5 
percent to 1.75 percent. This led to negative real interest rates (when inflation was 
factored in) which meant that banks borrowed money to make loans and, in real 
dollars, repaid less than they had borrowed. Cheap credit was a strategy to avoid and 
delay financial collapse and consequent global meltdown, but it is also how the Fed 
created the next bubble. It was also a strategy to sell the American dream to the poorest in 
the context of declining real wages.  
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After the dotcom crash, the era of easy credit led to speculation on the housing market. 
Home mortgage debt begun to show double digit growth, settling at around 16.6 
percent a year in the period between 2000-2005, compared to about 9.2 percent a year 
in the 1990s. This added to other working class indebtedness which grew through the 
last three decades. Loans were made available to working class people who would not 
have qualified previously because of low incomes or inadequate assets, and lenders did 
not seem interested in checking borrowers’ statements. This was not only due to cheap 
credit, but also the way mortgages were packaged into more complex debt 
instruments (which led to the international ramifications of the crisis.)  
  
The novel aspect of the “new” mortgage market was the banks' offloading of risk to 
the market through securitization, i.e. repackaging of these mortgages  into securities 
that combined a wide range of risks and promises of repayment by a variety of agents; 
investments that were sold off to hedge funds, pension funds, and back to commercial 
banks themselves. All these factors, plus the contradictory systems of incentives for 
different agents in their efforts to maximize profit caused drastic increases in home 
prices, which almost doubled in the 2000-2005 period.9 Thiswas fundamental to allow 
sworking class people to turn into speculators and compensate their falling wages 
with capital gains on their houses. Ultimately however, this bubble burst because debt 
must be paid back, with interest. And this is not always possible, if the cost of 
repayment increases above what the borrower can afford. One factor contributing to 
the wave of defaults was the Fed’s seventeen interest rates hikes between June 2004 
and June 2006. The higher rates affected a variety of borrowers, but especially the 
more vulnerable ones with adjustable rate mortgages.    
  
In July 2007, according to some estimates, a month before the official opening of the 
sub-prime crisis, home foreclosures were almost 100 percent above the previous year. 
The increase in foreclosures in turn contributed to a fall in further lending and a drop 
in home prices. By March 2008 average home prices had fallen by almost 20 percent 
from their peak in June 2006.10 A fall in house prices in turn prevented many 
homeowners from playing the speculator’s game (borrowing against the rising value 
of their houses) for the purpose of maintaining their livelihoods.   
  
What followed from the crisis was a multimillion state intervention to save banks “too 
big to fail” in the sense that their bankruptcy would threaten the stability of global 
finance capital and, more generally, the entire capitalist system in its current form. 
States have not been shy from Keynesian polic, with Obama attempting some stimulus 
to get the economy growing, with little success. The expectations of profitability are 
too low for investors to re-start the economy, and the accumulated debt is too high. 
The crisis turned from a private debt crisis into a sovereign debt crisis, with countries 
like Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal on the firing line of “unpleased” 
financial capital for spending too much in debt services owned to banks that were 
saved by the public purse. Strong austerity policies are now back in fashion in Europe 
again, the same type of policies the cycle of neaoliberalism started more than four 
decades ago.  
 
9 Calculated from Case-Shiller Home Price Index 
(http://www.standardandpoors.com).   
10 Calculated from the data provided by US Census Bureau 
(www.census.gov/const/uspricemon.pdf). The global trend is still downward (IMF 
2012).  
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Impasse 
 
Today economic crisis is a capitalist crisis of social stability, not a simple recession. It 
is a crisis that requires a realignment and reconfiguration of class relations and new 
systems of governance in order to re-establish growth and accumulation.11 The last 
two times in which a real change in capital’s governance occurred was the embracing 
of “Keynesianism” in the post-WWII period  and in the late 1970s with the shift to 
“Neoliberalism”. Both followed periods of intense social struggles that developed senses 
and perceptions guiding and orienting social movements towards alternative socio-
economic arrangements. When this happens, capital, fearing that “ideas grip the 
masses”  is suddenly willing to shift “governance” paradigm, absorb some of the 
struggles with appealing deals to some sections of the struggling movement, and 
displace the cost of doing so onto other communities, sections of the working class, 
and the environment across the globe. Division of the social body has always been a 
strategy of capital development.12 
 
Yet this time, things have become more economically complex. With no World War 
that would allow massive devaluation of capital; a mass of debt that prevents re-
inflating the economy through further debt; levels of economic growth that are 
insufficient to repay existing debt; and a planet that is warming up dangerously; in 
facing this crisis of social stability, capital is actually facing an impasse. By “impasse” I 
mean a crucial moment in the growth of a social system. It is a moment in which vital 
support for this system is not forthcoming in sufficient amount, neither in terms of 
expectation of profit, nor in terms of  social acceptance.  
 
 
This support is not forthcoming in sufficient amount especially from the environment 
of the capitalist system. Capital, understood as social force organizing social 
cooperation for the purpose of accumulation, has a twofold environment. One, 
constituted by social systems that reproduce the various facets of life in a non-
commodified way and in which access to money is, at most, only one of their 
contingent aims. This is the universe of social cooperation that is, at most, connected 
to capital circuits through what Marx describes as “selling in order to buy” and for 
which money is only a means through which needs are satisfied (and not an end in 
itself as it is for capital). When the purchased commodities exit the sphere of 
circulations into these non-capitalist spheres of social cooperation (households, 
associations, networks, etc.), they often enter the culturally and politically variegated 
sphere of the commons for which money is formost a means, not an end. The cultural 
and physical reproduction of labour power, the value-creating commodity so critically 
important for capital, occurs in such a sphere, outside capital but, of course, strictly 
coupled to it.  
11 For a discussion of crisis of social stability as opposed to other forms of crisis, see 
De Angelis (2007). 
12 For an historical and theoretical discussion of how Keynesianism was founded on 
particular deals with sections of the working class, see De Angelis (2000). For a 
theoretical discussion of the relation between capitalist development and social 
stratification, see the interventions in The Commoner N. 12, Spring/Summer 2007. 
For a discussion of the current crisis along the lines proposed here, Midnight Notes 
and Friends (2009).  
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The other system that capital must seek support from is the ecological system upon 
which all forms of social organization depend on. This has its own mechanisms 
through which it absorbs and processes the externalities of capital. This impasse can 
be seen in the fact that on one hand, micro and macro systems of social reproduction, 
devastated and atomised, made flexibile and precarious, by the reduction of wage and 
welfare of the last 30 years and strangled with debt, and with no prospect of 
betterment given the current course of the economic crisis and the recipes on the 
tables of the global elites that we will discuss in following sections, or shattered by 
the many resource enclosures that have devastated many communities in the global 
south, face an increasing difficulty to support capital with further absorption of its 
cost-shifting externalities since to do so would undermine their own reproduction. On 
the other hand, the ecosystem is showing increasing inability to support capital in its 
endless quest for more resource extraction and use of the atmosphere as bottomless 
greenhouse gas sink.  
 
The imperative question becomes whether capital can renew itself as a social force of 
“creative destruction” and transformation and break its impasse on its own term (with 
all the “negative externalities” that any new phase of capitalist growth bring about), 
or whether another social force can emerge by fostering social cooperation in a 
direction that breaks the impasse and fight the chains of the old and constitute the 
new. If it is the latter, is this a social force that can be understood as communist? 
Before addressing these questions we need to enquire about the meaning of social 
force.  
 
Social forces 
 
I understand social forces to be social systems that seek their  own expanded 
reproduction through their operations at whatever scale of social action, and by thus 
doing they influence, clash, contaminate, subsume, couple with, transform, or destroy 
other social systems, making them the means of their own development. They are 
coagulation of a plurality of social powers around particular types of values, practices 
and relations, in so far as their social reproduction is concerned, articulate social 
subjects and ecologies through value specific and coordinating operations. For 
example, capital has clearly been a social force in the last few hundred years, that is a 
social system based on sub-systemic circuits of accumulation that expand, connect, 
weave and reshape society to its images and priorities.13 Also the commons have been 
a social force, in the sense that pluralities that have formed communities of struggles 
(in the shape of trade unions, committees, networks, etc), have claimed different types 
of social wealth as common resources (education, health, social security, 
communication, etc.) and also struggled for inclusive and deep democratic practices 
for their access and co-governance (commoning).  
 
In situated and historical contexts however, social forces need plans that is, specific 
ways and selections to coagulate and channel social action in such a way as to force-
out, outflank or co-opt other social forces and overcome the barriers they are facing. 
Since we are not talking about a rigid command structure in which these social forces 
13 With this I mean circuits based on the M-C-M’ formula (i.e. money-commodity-
more money) that Marx discusses in Chapter 3 of Capital. For a discussion of 
contemporary capitalism following Marx’s circuits analysis, see De Angelis (2007). 
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operate, this coagulation of social powers and cooperation is produced through 
moments of situated selection of what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’ and of actual actions 
upon these selections that is practices of social cooperation that produce value. The repetition 
of these selections into clusters and patterns acts through a strengthening of bonds 
among different nodes of social cooperation. This strengthening of bonds corresponds 
to a clustering of a diverse range of value practices around a shared sense-horizon. 
Social forces are thus coagulations of productive, reproductive, affective social powers 
around a sense-horizon that orient action in a particular direction. It is when this 
shared sense-horizon is coupled with the materiality of the exercise of social powers 
that we have a social force capable of transforming reality. I call a “plan” the sense 
horizon that a social force must possess in order to be constitutive of the new.  
 
Let us clarify what do we mean by sense-horizon. I use the term here to build on 
Niklas Luhmann’s concept of Sense. This shared sense is always a construction by a 
system, hence “it can also be defined as a selection within the horizon of what is 
possible” (Moeller: 2006 225), that is what is considered possible from within the 
perspective of system’s reproduction. Sense-horizon provides an orientation plane, a 
measure between the actual and the possible. Luhmann makes the example of a ship, 
which through its movements uses the horizon for orientation. The direction chosen 
by the ship (the actual), is just one selection within a range of possible direction 
provided by the horizons. So, the sense horizons of capital in general, i.e. independent 
of actual conditions, is very clear: accumulation. Every corporation in every epoch has 
this bottom line as ultimate objective which is not so much  an ethical stand, but a 
drive, a conatus of self-preservation qua capital as social system (De Angelis 2007). 
All the same, at the macro level, this also implies “growth” as capital’s horizon.  
 Different school of thoughts, writers, interpreters, commentators, policy makers and 
economists may of course cluster in different paradigms and have differing views of 
how profit, or “growth” can be achieved, or of course may have distinct views about 
the socially or ethically acceptable costs for achieving it. But these opinions or 
paradigms are particular selections within a given commons sense-horizon, that of 
accumulation.  
 
However, sense-horizons and actual selections within horizons can be contested. In social 
systems, not only the specific selections within horizons, but the horizon of what is 
possible can be contested. While the former case corresponds to a meaning of conflict 
that reproduces a social system, it is in the latter case that social systems are 
challenged by other social systems as social force. Let us take an example. Let us 
imagine for example that water provisions for some given urban neighbourhoods are 
delivered by communities of residents who pool together their resources and organize 
common labour to dig wells, build aqueducts and distribution systems to households, 
and manage maintenance of the water system. Let us say that people participation is 
the most effective and convenient way to bring safe and clean waters to homes, since 
the public water system does not have resources to deliver to the poorer districts and 
the private providers would deliver at very high prices. While providing for their own 
water, commuities also talk about other problems, and possible ways to deal with 
them. They also constitute associations that bring together all the water associations, 
so as to manage resources across different areas and distribute them when they are 
most needed, but also to constitute a political front vis-à-vis state and corporations 
for claiming more resources or resisting pressures of subordination to capital. We 
have here a social system (the systems of water associations) whose sense-horizon is 
not accumulation, but reproduction of the community and of the resources needed to 
reproduce this community through commoning, the social cooperation of the 
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community which decide the what, the when, the how and the who of social 
reproduction. There is an expansive logic here as well, in that the communities 
working cooperatively seek to reach out to those sections of the poor population who 
are still paying huge prices for poorly delivered water by private providers. Until one 
day the government decides to privatise all water, not just public, but also community 
run water systems. That is, multinational corporations with their sense-horizon that 
seek accumulation, will now descend into the poor communities of Cochabamba   
this is the real case we are talking about before the water wars of 2001  and put up 
water meters on community build infrastructure in order to calculate payments due 
to them. A clear clash among social systems and correspondent sense horizons. 
 
The general terms of the water example can be mapped into any struggles: in factories, 
in offices, in neighbourhoods, along rivers and mountains in which communities fight 
against their enclosures, against the construction of dams of High Speed trains, in land 
seized by landless movement, in cyberspace struggles against the enclosure of 
knowledge and so on. In all these cases, in different forms and through different 
means, we witness at clashing social forces, that is clashing social powers and sense 
horizons.  
 
 
Plans 
 
In a given situation, at the micro or macro scale, we can call “Plans” the strategic 
selections around which different social forces coalesce. At the macro scale, there are 
today two main “Plans” around which contemporary capitalist forces can hope to 
recover into a social force in order to deal with the impasse. I call these Plan A and 
Plan B which include the type and range of selections ↓ of policies, of social relations, 
of institutions, of procedures, and so on ↓ within the range of what is believed make 
accumulation  capital’s drive and sense- horizons  possible. These two plans are 
‘Neoliberalism plus’ and ‘Keynesianism plus.’ In both cases, the strategic selections are 
like path towards the  horizon coinciding with the dominance of capitalism, and hence 
with an “end of history” perspective typical of Fukuyama (1992).14  
 
There are also two alternative plans, alternatives that may be seen compatible with 
capital in the short run in the sense that they take it as a starting point, but that in the 
long run see themselves as social forces of transformation beyond capital. These are 
Plans C&D and Plan E&F or ‘Communism plus,’ and ‘Fascism plus.’  
 
In a phase of impasse, a range of operational options that become contingent to a 
particular political economic situation constitutes each of the following “Plans”.  
 
Plan A(Neoliberalsm plus): Plan A seek to coalesce social cooperation around the need 
of capital accumulation closely through the attractors of markets, livelihoods 
threatening competition, a system of minimization of social protection and public 
investments, and, the strong hand of disciplinary finance and debt. In this plan, the 
14 Incidentally, when in the past the possible was also perceived as a system of different 
nature, as non-capitalist ↓ like in the era of the XIX century revolutions ↓ the nuclear 
arsenal of the cold war contributed to make sure it was kept at a distance. The thesis 
of the end of history was first proposed by Fukuyama (1992). 
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state is not dissolving, but acquires the function of supporting markets with reforms 
that either promote markets, or replace markets in some specific cases with the view of 
promoting social cooperation through the market. In some versions, civil society also 
plays a complementary role to absorb shocks. In others, government is heavily 
downsized to its policing and military functions.  
  
  
Plan B (Keynesianism plus): Plan B seeks to coalesce social cooperation around the 
need of capital accumulation closely through the triple attractors of markets, states, 
and, in different degrees, civil society. The state is seen as an active agent not only 
promoting a “right” environment for economic growth (accumulation) but in some 
cases also to direct the type of growth and industries, to counter the concentration of 
wealth produced by the markets through redistribution, and to implement 
countercyclical policies in the hope of reducing unemployment. An active role of 
organised labour and civil society ↓ like unions, NGOs ↓ is fundamental to mediate 
between different interests in society, although this require these interests to share 
the horizon of capitalist development.   
 
Plan C&D (Communism plus): Plan C&D (commons and democracy) seeks to coalesce 
social cooperation around the expansion and rhizomatic integration of alternative 
modes of social cooperation based on shared resources and their horizontal 
government by communities, with the goals of social justice, freedom and 
emancipation. This plan is centered on the commons, not only through the making of 
new social practices, but also, through democratization of market and state functions 
that is, through their communalization.  Capital accumulation and the existing state 
apparatuses and functions at the different scales are here only a given condition of 
departure, the disastrous social effects of which are now visible ad hominem, not a goal 
to be pursued in the long run.  
 
Plan E&F (Fascism plus): For plan E&F (exclusion/emergency and fascism) seeks to 
coalesce social cooperation not around the expansion of capitalist accumulation (which 
may become an instrument, not a goal), but the greatness of a nation, an ethnic group 
or a community, purified against what are perceived contaminates whether social 
(foreigners, migrants) or value cultural (gays and lesbians, particular religions). As in 
plan C&D – and disturbingly so ↓ this plan requires the active participation of the 
“community”, but in close organic connection to a hierarchical state that does not 
hesitate to use force against any form of “otherness”.  
 
The four Plans are not mutually exclusive. The Bush years have seen a remarkable 
realignment between Plan A and Plan E&F, especially around the so-called “war on 
terror”. The same can be said of the management of borders in the neoliberal period 
in Europe, the USA and many other parts of the world. It is equally visible in the 
increasing securitization of our lives. In the Keynesian period (old Keynesianism) 
elements of plan A (including a functional use of welfare to return to market work) 
were heavily used in the middle of a fully fledged Plan B orthodoxy. So were the early 
experiments of Plan A, as in New York Fiscal crisis in the mid 1970s. Plan C&D was 
unhappily married with Plan E&F and elements of Plan B during Stalinism. The Plan 
A of the neoliberal period since the late 1970s were often coupled with elements of 
Plan B, as in the Reagan expansionary military Keynesianism of the early 1980s, and 
the mild fiscal stimulus of the post 2008 crisis in the US accompanied with the 
nationalization of banks “too big to fail”.  
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State of the Plans after 2008 
 
What is the state of these Plans after the crisis of 2008? For the purpose of this 
analysis, I only deal with the first three of these Plans, leaving the discussion of Plan 
E&F to another occasion. But this should not be taken as implying that this plan is 
unimportant. Conditions of deep crisis and hopelessness do create a fertile ground 
for fascism to arise, for modes of exclusion to emerge and prosper.The growing neo-
Nazi influence in poor neighborhoods in Greece is a clear example. Also, I am only 
looking at these  emerging plans only as global in reach, that is in so far as they 
could be adopted by social forces that aspires to mobilize and order social 
cooperation at the global level. 
 
Capitalist plans: Plan A and B 
 
In summer 2008, when the full blow of the subprime crisis hit the news, many critics 
thought that neoliberalism was finished, that it was clear that the regime of globalised 
markets and financialisation had come to an end, that it had imploded under the weight 
of its own contradictions. Even some of the dominant figures responsible for the 
management of global Plan A began to voice doubt. The most remarkable admission 
coming from Alan Greenspan who in Congressional testimony on October 23, 2008, 
acknowledged that he was "partially" wrong in opposing regulation of derivatives and, 
referring to his free-market ideology, said he “found a flaw and was partially wrong 
to oppose regulation of derivatives.”15 
 
This of course did not happen. What happened was a concerted effort to save the “too 
big to fail” banks and the continuation of the regime of neoliberal capital. As the public 
purse took over the responsibility to inject public money into failing banks thus 
tactically modifying Plan A, and the effect of the financial crisis began to result in 
terms of recession and unemployment, many governments around the world begun ti 
implement heavy austerity policies for the rest of us. In a move that bits the hands 
that has saved it, financial capital started to attack sovereign debt, the debt hold by 
sovereign states. Bonds issued by governments to raise finance to cover the holes of 
state administration (including the payment of previous debt), were sold at increasing 
cost to the states and in return of clear commitment to debt reduction (including cuts 
in public services, pensions, health care and education). In the Eurozone, EU, IMF 
and ECB – the now infamous troika – were at the forefront of the management of this 
imposition of austerity with the Greek government. In Italy, the “technical” 
government of Mario Monti found support across the parliament to implement the 
austerity cuts that not even the much-ridiculed Berlusconi’s government could have 
dreamed to be able to implement. In the autumn 2011, the “spread” ↓ the deviation 
between interest rates paid by Southern European government bonds and German’s 
bonds, began to increase to a point that interest rates in the periphery of Europe 
become unsustainable, forcing governments into a vicious cycle of austerity cuts to 
“please” financial markets and liberate resources to pay debt, which in turn reduced 
growth, which in turn increased the need for external borrowing, which in turn 
necessitated austerity cuts to “please” financial markets. In this mechanism, “financial 
markets” are never “pleased”, they have never enough. What is appearing in this crisis 
15 See for example the report on the New York Times by Andrews (2008) 
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is the most basic function of financial markets, the one underpinning the logic of their 
liberalization in the 1980s and seldom spelled out with clarity in finance textbooks: 
their disciplinary role. In the realm of currencies and government bonds, the function is 
disciplinary in the sense that they govern what is considered socially necessary in 
terms of the general conditions of reproduction of a country. They perform the great 
equalizing game of public expenditures in social services and the cost of bureaucracies, 
not in relation to an evaluation of the actual needs of a country, but in relation to the 
productive capacities of those countries as measured by its international 
competitiveness. In other words, social reproduction is subservient to production for 
profit, not the other way around.  
 
There are actually two broad Plans As. Plan A1 is pretty much patching up the 
contradictions of the crisis and continue with the policy trend of the last 30 years of 
neolibralism. Plan A2 is to be very serious about downsizing governments and free 
markets. In Europe for example, Plan A1 can be summarized in the current range of 
policy attempts to “save the euro”, that is the sharing of the cost of debt across the 
eurozone, but in view of some form of heavy structural adjustment in the countries 
under attack. The basics of Plan A1 is the continuation of austerity policies in the hope 
to restore growth at some point. What are the sources of this growth are not clear 
since all emergent economies are slowing down. In Europe, Plan A1 takes a range of 
ad hoc policies and proposals from issuing eurobonds (the most contested proposal) to 
ECB instituting Outright Monetary Transaction schemes, in which ECB would offer 
to purchase eurozone short-term bonds in exchange for fiscal and structural reforms. 
This reduction of national state authority will reduce even more the already much 
eroded scope of political representation at the national level and govern austerity from 
distant Brussels.  
 
The European Plan A1 is much the mirror of global Plan A1, essentially continuing 
things as if the 2008 crisis has not happened. The plan here is to link any aspects of 
social reproduction to the capacity of people and institutions to borrow money hence 
to repay debt. From this follows the engeenering of a commitment to a life of work 
(often precarious and with little social security entitlements) at the service of capital 
accumulation. But the limits of plan A1 are clear. The system has reached a point that 
it may not be able to deliver the growth necessary to recover debt, and invest in new 
rounds. Recession and austerity can drag for years with its accumulating string of 
social and environmental problems and contestations, while global capitalism 
approaches a “steady state” that was the nightmare of classic political economists.  
 
There is an alternative to Plan A1 however, one that shares basic tenets of neoliberal 
philosophy, but changes the scope and impetus through which it may be applied. This, 
Plan A2, is one that paradoxically can take onboard some of the slogans from the 
streets against the use of public money to rescue banks such as‘end the bail out now.’ 
Cut against a horizon of fairness, it says: let the big banks fail.16 Let them pay the price 
of their own bad decisions. And since the conditions of business and social 
reproduction are so strictly tied to financial systems, their failure will also imply a 
chain of bankrupted businesses and the collapse of social security (for example, 
16 In the US this view was taken by a milieu comprising diverse people like Senator 
Richard Shelby, top Republican on the banking committee, House Representative Ron 
Paul, multimillionaire commodity trader like Jim Rogers, and the bulk of Austrian 
economists who would also favour the replacement of the fiat system with a stable 
dollar backed by precious metals or commodities, thus limiting overall debt creation.    
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pensions). The supporters of this approach have no doubt that the recession will be 
shorter (3 to 5 years!) and very, very painful, but the result will be to avoid 20 or 30 
years of stagnation and will create the conditions for heavy restructuring in such a 
way to recover growth. Of course, the recession will also be an opportunity for deeper 
cuts in government spending and to downsize government. Plan A ↓ in all its variants 
↓ is not really appealing from the perspective of social reproduction. The horizon is 
further marketisation of life-activities, further erosion of publicly funded services, 
entitlements and rights, further precarization of jobs, further dependence of people on 
debt, and further concentration of social wealth in fewer and fewer hands.  
 
Let us move to Plan B. Plan B share with Plan A the horizon of the end of history, of 
capitalism as the horizon within which selections are made. However, Plan B wishes 
for an interventionist state to deal with what is essentially seen as a problem of 
effective demand demonstrated by the stagnation of employment in most sectors 
across the world. If only governments were to inject massive amount of money into 
the economy through public spending, unemployment would fall and a recovery 
triggered. The deficits ensued would be cleared out by the increased tax revenues. 
Obviously, there are plenty of sectors that would benefit from such an injection of 
demand, from infrastructure investment to green technology, from military 
expenditures to health and education. In this sense, Plan B, like plan A, does not have 
a particular political colour, it is not necessarily right or left, it is not necessarily a 
“green new deal”, or a “socialist new deal” like in Venezuela. It could also be a “fascist 
new deal” since it is only a sense-horizon within capitalism. Such a programme, 
however, would need to meet some preconditions. In the first place, it requires some 
strong degree of coordination among the major economies around the world, 
especially in view of productive capital’s ability to fly toplaces with lower wages, lower 
costs, and lower taxes for the rich.  Second, in conditions of financial capital mobility, 
the effect of such policies would be offset by capital flying out from countries with 
high deficits, which would imply that higher ↓ hence depressing ↓ interest rates had 
to follow in order to keep capital. Point one would require accompanying Keynesian 
policies to some sort of productivity deals that make it profitable for capital to produce 
domestically. But the current class compositions of most countries lack the degree of 
homogeneity and structured representations that would allow for a period as precarity 
is now pervasive and union membership has generally been declining in the last 30 
years. 
 
In conditions of global competition and wage downward stickiness, proponents of 
Plan B evoke the need for competitive devaluations. So for example, the Greek crisis 
could be dealt by some, through Greece exiting the Euro and the managing of 
exchange rates to maintain an exchange rate favorable to Greek export (such as 
tourism and some agricultural products, and not much else).17 Paul Krugman, for 
example, urges countries in Southern Europe to follow the path of Argentina who, 
after the crisis in 2001, defaulted on debt and renegotiated its burden, decided to break 
the parity of the peso with the US dollar, embark in interventionist policies to manage 
competitive exchange rates and sustain wages, and create schemes for channeling 
income to poor.18 The result, using the standard measure of capitalist accumulation 
horizon, seems impressive as real GDP picked up from -14% in 2002 to about 8% in 
between 2003 and 2008 on average. GDP then collapsed to +0.9 in 2009 as effect of 
17 See for example Lapavistas (2011). 
18 See Krugman (2012). 
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the global crisis in 2008, to recover to 7.5 in 2010. But when one digs a bit further, we 
discover that inflation statistics with which to calculate real GDP have been tricked 
by the government who has to pay interest for its debt linked to inflation, to the point 
that even the Economist noticed.19  With inflation rates of 24.4% three times higher 
than the official current one of 9.7%, real GDP growth may have dissipated. Another 
side of the story involves the countries record on poverty reduction during the 
“success” years after 2001. The high poverty rate of 2002 which reached 57.5% after 
the hit of the crisis has declined, but to a level that is similar to the infamous 1990s 
(around 30%). This isnot a real solution. The reduction has concentrated in areas like 
the South where the incidence of poverty was lower. Boosted real wages also 
recovered to the level of the 1990s average ($3135), but only for employment in the 
formal sector and the cooperative sectors (there are about 10,000 cooperative in 
Argentina). The informal sector in Argentina is massive. With no access to social 
security, excluding unemployed,  
 
 informal workers represents 39% of the economically active population  in 
Argentina. The great majority of these workers (52%) are employed in  a small 
microenterprise of no more than 3 workers. In these  microenterprises the 
“owner” is a worker that undertakes a job similar to  that of the other workers, 
but exercises some leadership over the others.  The capital of these 
microenterprises are workers tools and instruments,  but there is no specific 
return to capital as in a traditional enterprise.  These are not enterprises that 
operate under the logic of “capital plus  work”, but on a relation of “work plus 
work20. 
 
 
Plan B in Argentina, therefore, does not offer much in terms of an horizon of 
emancipation from poverty. The gains that have been made with respect to 2001 crisis, 
are gains that are concentrated in some areas and sectors (waged sectors) and in any 
case are only comparable to conditions before the crisis – these being dark years of 
development. Finally, government intervention and deals with unions only involve 
about half of the working population. Perhaps the only success story in Argentina 
during the crisis was the wave of factory occupations and self-management in 2001. 
But this, of course, is part of Plan C&D, not Plan B. 
 
Plan C&D 
 
If there is one thing that characterizes plan C&D it is thought and practice from below. 
The demands of structural reforms that may come from it do not have the pretense to 
govern the capitalist economy, only to refuse to accept cuts in the social wage, to 
extend the realms of commons and the deepening of democracy. Plan C&D’s primary 
ground for development is to refuse the intensifying crisis of social reproduction that 
Plan A and B will promote and/or attempt to govern. As with the other plans, also 
some of its elements will be meshed with and intersected to other plans. In Venezuela 
for example, a redistributive and transfer to the poor policy (Plan B) is associated to 
strong involvement of grassroots in communalizing aspects of social reproduction. At 
times, this is done to guarantee the survival of life-systems through deals, and the 
quality of these deals depends on power relations. At other times, it is a matter of 
19 See The Economist (2012).  
20 See Millan-Smitmans (2010:12).   
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resistance to cuts that preserve elements of Plan B inside a Plan A (as for example 
some rights and entitlements of the welfare state that were set up while Plan B was 
he orthodoxy in during the 1970s in many countries in the West).    
 
At the micro level, there are two sources to Plan C&D. First, Plan C&D find its roots 
in the fertile soil of communities engaged in different forms of daily life reproduction. 
In city neighborhoods, shanty towns, and villages across the world, there are a variety 
of patterns of participation where, to various degrees, resources are shared and 
communities are engaged in forms of participatory democracy to decide the what, the 
how, the when, the why and the who of social reproduction. The organization of an 
event such as a fiesta or sagra in a Spanish or Italian rural province, a street party in 
a English town, the maintenance of a community vegetable garden in a neighborhood 
in New York, of water systems by a community water associations in a Bolivian town, 
the creation of alternative economies to distribute potatoes or the guaranteeing a self 
managed health service in an occupied hospital in crisis ridden Greece, in the day to 
day governance of a volunteer run ambulance service in a mountain community in 
Italy are all modulations of the same thing. In these interactions, communities are 
formed and sustained through the sharing of some resources and the participation in 
the governance of the commons, governance that often also involves direct social 
labour, which I call commoning21. The furthering of the crisis and the deepening of 
austerity and reduction in social spending, in spite of social resistance to it, will push 
communities to come together and be reshaped through sharing projects such as 
community gardens, care of children and the elderly, greater participation in schools 
educational projects, solidarity networks, labour cooperatives, time banks networks, 
barter systems, and even self management of companies left by their bankrupted 
owners. The commons, in other words, will increasingly become a necessity of social 
reproduction. 
 
These fertile soils for Plan C&D indicate that in these occasions of community 
engagement in daily-life activities the social substance for the creation of a new world 
resides. To be more precise, within the often-limited boundaries of these social 
systems, we have alternative modes of production highly distinct from those promoted 
by capital. Unlike the reproduction of capital systems which is only based on endless 
accumulation, here resources and communities are brought together by a commoning 
activity that allows the reproduction and sustainability of both communities and 
shared resources.  
 
The second source of Plan C&D is struggle that pushes the boundaries of capital and 
the state. In this sense, social movements that have been developing since the mid 
1990s (i.e. in the late neoliberal era) have not only been opposing various instances of 
Plan A, but have also developed organizational forms that seek to re-invent people’s 
participation in movements, focusing on the commons. These movements have been 
quite distinct ↓ from indigenous people in Chiapas, to community struggles against 
dams in India, from the indignatos in Spain, to the Occupy movements in the USA, 
from the reclaim the street in the UK in the late 1990s, to the democracy movement 
in Northern Africa in 2011. Notwithtanding fundamental differences in contexts, 
social composition and political language, all these movements are organized upon a 
24 hours ‘round-the-clock’ bodily presence, that seek “to put an end to the separation 
between the personal and the political, and political activism and the reproduction of 
21 Peter Linebough (2008) rediscovered the use of this verb among the XIIIth 
Century English commoners describing their activities in the forest commons.  
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everyday life,” (Federici 2010: 8). This often follows the occupation of a public space 
and its turning into a commons, as in the case of Occupy or Tahrir.22 Other times it 
follows the defence of an existing commons, and the opening up of opportunities for 
the development through cross contamination during political struggle, as in the case 
of the struggle of Zapatistas communities in Chiapas since the mid 1990s, or the water 
wars in Bolivia in 2001. Other times it involve the reclaiming of a private space as 
commons, as in the case of the factories in Argentina in 2001. As waves in an ocean of 
subjectivities turning desires into situated needs, these movements pull back from 
visibility, and consolidate into new institutions or dissipate through the social systems 
of daily life. It seems that no victory is achieved, and to a large extent, this is so. But 
if from the perspective of the present the glass seems half empty, from that of historical 
possibility it may well be half-full, and the future new world may well be accounting 
these outbursts as the historical movement of its own actualisation. Some times the 
institutions created by these struggles must find ways to engage with markets to 
survive, and enter its competitive circuits, as it is for Argentinian cooperatives. Some 
other times they dissipate into new spaces of protest, as in the case of the Occupy 
movement that is now occupying the fron gardens of residences to prevent 
reposessions from bailifs. For some others, their energies are directed towards the 
construction of new institution of self-governance, as in the case of the Zapatistas. 
 
These two sources, life reproduction through commons, and commons through social 
movements, are by and large quite separate today. That is to say that there are vast 
areas of social life that is governed through commons, yet it is not politicised, is not 
connected to a critical understanding of capital and to a politics of emancipation from 
it. On the other hand, there are vast amounts of political energies that are still wasted 
in struggles for power without an organic connection to commons, that is the very 
source of social power. There is much thinking and organisational practice that need 
to be done in order to articulate these two sources effectively into Plan C&D that is 
able to contrast capital and acquire hegemony a the global and coordinated level. The 
novelty of current movements however, is to have brought these two dimensions 
(commons and struggle) together for the current time. Bringing together these two 
dimensions, not only in the sense that the form of the movement ↓ say that of an 
occupation ↓ requires to establish some life in common to sustain it (and therefore to 
experiment with form of direct democracy and governance of the occupied common 
space) but also because the movement has coalesced social forces around a sense-
horizon in which commoners ↓ the famous 99% of the Occupy movements ↓ are an 
22 As noted by Caffenzis (2012: 10) “A public space is ultimately a space owned and 
opened/closed by the state, it is a res-publica, a public thing. A common space, in 
contrast, is opened by those who occupy it, i.e., those who live on it and share it 
according to their own rules. The worldwide movement of occupiers (through their 
practice) is demanding common spaces where they can live on in order to give body 
to their political thoughts. That is why the first acts of the Occupations involve 
housework: where are we to sleep, eat, urinate, defecate, clean up, etc.? This is not 
trivial, for in discovering the power of bodies that present themselves instead of being 
re-presented by others, their continued presence multiplies that power and 
momentum. This is what the government and Wall Street especially hate about the 
occupations and why there has been so much violence unleashed against them: they 
prefigure another way to organize society and to create a new commons.  The 
parliaments and council chambers are temples of absence, while the Tahrir Squares of 
the world are places where a general will is embodied and in action.” 
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active force in the constitution of social systems (whether a political system or 
economic system). For example, the massive students struggles in Canada against fees 
(and in the UK and US) are pointing at a different education system. The Occupy 
movement in the US and of the Indignatos in Spain, are pointing to a different  
economic system; the struggle in Tahiri square, to a different political system. In all 
cases, the struggles point at a different notion of democracy, one in which people have 
the power to veto (or in the language of grassroots assemblies based on consensus) to 
block some government decisions (like the increase in education fees in Quebec) or 
practice (like the one of a lax systems of regulatory practices that facilitates banks 
frauds at the expenses of pensions and savings). These struggles are struggles of a 
plurality that see the “state” as a distorted commons that need to be communalise and 
fight the corruption of money through deep democratic means. 
 
Conclusion: what has to be done? 
 
 
The “D” in Plan C&D is thus not only an adjunct to the C of commons. The commons 
that emerge in the squares and streets of contemporary struggles ↓  are often 
democratic, in the deep, participatory sense. By deep democracy I mean not a 
particular model of democracy ↓ like representative vs direct democracy ↓ but a sense 
horizon that urge us to select direct democratic means whenever it is possible.  
 
The “D” stands for democracy as a weapon for communalization of property ↓ whether 
in the hands of the state or in the hands of individual capitalists ↓ that is especially to 
seize under user communities control the right to manage and redefine and enlarge 
the boundaries of inclusions of productive and reproductive systems.  In this sense, in 
the eyes of the 1% democracy becomes “too much” when it infringes its right to rule 
over our lives. From a C&D perspective, the first act of democracy occurs when a 
plurality far greater than the 1% claims ownership to a resource in that it claims the 
rights of exclusion and management, two rights within that “bundle of rights” called 
“property”, and that are the necessary condition to actualize a resource as a 
commons.23  
 
Thus, to turn into a commons (communalize) a factory, a university, a water system, 
a park, a public administration or whatever, a plurality must claim back the “right to 
manage”. This “explosion of management” corresponds to a sudden increase in the 
volume of social cooperation and correspondent release of playful energies that follows 
a breakdown of management systems and the scattering ↓ to different degrees ↓ of 
management functions into the social body. These energies can be channeled into the 
cyclical time of system sustainability (reproduction) through deep democratic forms 
of governments, that is, institutions of the commons. Democracy and the commons 
are two sides of the same coin. The extent of communalisation is not possible because 
of power relations and insufficient organizational reach, but a plurality of commoners 
can start to claim a resource (or an institution) as a commons from which they are 
23 “Groups of individuals are considered to share communal property rights when they 
have formed an organization that exercises at least the collective-choice rights of 
management and exclusion in relationship to some defined resource system and the 
resource units produced by that system. In other words, all communal groups have 
established some means of governing themselves in relationship to a resource.” 
(Ostrom, Bouckaert, & De Geest 2000: 342) See Also Ostrom (1990). 
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excluded and cannot manage. The very act of claiming is the first step of an 
organisational journey that is necessary to undertake to actually turn the resources 
that are claimed as commons into an actual commons system. 24One thing that is 
certain is that Plan C&D requires the enthusiastic participation and intelligence of 
everybody.  
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